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Climate Change Litigation in the African System 
Sam Adelman 
Abstract: 
Surprising few cases directly related to climate change have been litigated in African tribunals given 
the vulnerability of the 55 member states of the African Union to climatic harms. A majority of 
the litigation has focused upon environmental issues with climate-related aspects. Capacity 
constraints limit the potential for climate litigation, but cases are likely to increase as climate 
breakdown intensifies. This chapter analyses the cases that have been brought, including the 
landmark actio popularis brought by SERAC in 2001 on the right to a healthy environment in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It considers directions for future litigation and 
draws conclusions about how this can be facilitated. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Climate breakdown has led to a rapid increase in climate litigation around the world, but there 
have been few cases specifically related to global heating in Africa.1 This is surprising in light of 
the continent’s vulnerability to climatic harms due to relatively low levels of development, 
resilience, and adaptive capacities.2 Between 75 and 250 million people on the continent are water 
stressed and yields in some countries from rain-fed agriculture are decreasing.3 The UN 
Environment Programme estimates that heating of 2˚C will threaten more than half the continent’s 
population with malnutrition. Even if this dangerous level is avoided, the continent will face annual 
adaptation costs of $50 billion by 2050 and annual GDP losses equivalent to 2-4 per cent by 2040.4 
Section 2 considers the classification of climate-related litigation and discusses the problems 
confronting litigants in many African countries. Section 3 examines avenues for litigation in the 
domestic, regional and international spheres. In section 4, I discuss cases that have been brought 
in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa. In section 5, I suggest directions for future litigation 
in domestic tribunals and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights drawing on the 
example of the 2017 Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
 
1 By January 2020, nearly 1500 cases had been filed in more than 30 countries <http://climatecasechart.com/>, 
accessed 3 May 2020. Global heating is a term that better reflects the continuous increase in average global temperature 
than global warming; see for example <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/13/global-heating-
more-accurate-to-describe-risks-to-planet-says-key-scientist>, accessed 3 May 2020.  
2 Berhanu, Merertu, and Alemayehu Oljira Wolde, ‘Review on Climate Change Impacts and its Adaptation strategies 
on Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2019) 19(3) Agricultural Socio-Economics Journal 145. 
3 Mohapatra, Sabita, Climate Change, New Security Challenges and the United Nations (Routledge 2018) 44.  
4 UNEP, ‘Responding to climate change’ <https://www.unenvironment.org/regions/africa/regional-
initiatives/responding-climate-change>, accessed 2 March 2020. 
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on the environment and human rights.5 Section 6 draws conclusions about climate litigation in 
Africa to date.6 
Climate litigation in the global South is less common, more low key and has attracted less attention 
than in the North.7 There is some debate in the literature about the definition of climate litigation.8 
There are divergent views about what constitutes a climate change case. Markell and Ruhl define 
climate litigation as federal, state, tribal or local administrative or judicial litigation in which litigant 
filings or tribunal decisions directly and expressly raise an issue of fact or law relating to the causes 
or impacts of climate change.9 Peel and Osofsky define it as cases that have climate change at their 
core and raise climate-specific arguments or judicial analysis referring to climate change.10 They 
distinguish between core and peripheral cases and note that a  significant number of cases ‘reflect 
a “peripheral” focus on climate change rather than having the issue at the “core” of the litigation’.11 
They identify five core cases in Africa, three from South Africa.12 
Setzer and Benjamin identify five climate litigation cases in Africa whereas Peel and Lin discern 
six.13 Peel and Lin use five criteria: the identity of the plaintiffs and defendants; whether climate 
change was a core or peripheral issue; the nature of the claim, e.g. environmental impact 
assessments, public trust, rights violations, etc.; whether the Paris Agreement or implementing 
legislation was relied upon in the claim or decision; and whether NGOs were involved.14 
In Africa, development has generally taken precedence over environmental concerns even though 
it is clear that climate breakdown leads to underdevelopment and impoverishment.15 Global 
 
5 Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights, (Pact of San Jose), Costa Rica, 22 
November 1969; Organization of African Unity (OAU), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), 
27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
6 Joana Setzer and Rebecca Byrnes, Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot (Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of 
Economics and Political Science 2019). 
7 Jacqueline Peel and Jolene Lin, ‘Transnational Climate Litigation: The Contribution of the Global South’ (2019) 
113(4) American Journal of International Law 679; Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin. ‘Climate litigation in the Global South: 
constraints and innovations’ (2020) 9(1) Transnational Environmental Law 77. 
8 On the criteria that qualify cases as climate-related, see Joana Setzer and Lisa Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A 
review of research on courts and litigants in climate governance’ (2019) 10(3) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change 580. 
9 David Markell and J.B. Ruhl, ‘An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or 
Business as Usual?’ (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review 5, 21. 
10 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (CUP 2015); Peel 
and Lin (n 7). 
11 Peel and Lin (n 7) 692. 
12 Ibid, 704. 
13 Setzer and Benjamin (n 7); Peel and Lin (n 7). 
14 Peel and Lin (n 7) 702. 
15 Werner Scholtz, ‘Human rights and the environment in the African Union context’ in Anna Grear and Louis Kotzé 
(eds), Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (Edward Elgar 2015), 415. However, Frans Viljoen argues 
that the African human rights framework is designed to reconcile the tension between environmental rights and the 
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heating tends to have less salience in public discourse and government policy although this may 
change as climatic harms such as droughts, desertification and flooding intensify. Setzer and 
Benjamin note that litigation in many Southern countries focuses upon development-related 
environmental threats such as hazardous waste and safe drinking water rather than directly upon 
global heating.16 Likewise, Peel and Lin observe that climate change matters are more likely to be 
‘packaged up with a range of other issues, such as […] pollution, land-use and forestry, natural 
resource conservation, disaster risk management, implementation of planning frameworks or 
environmental justice and rights claims’.17 Litigation is more likely to address localised 
environmental issues which may have climate-related elements than climate change per se. 
The legacies of colonialism in legal systems in many sub-Saharan countries states are relatively 
underdeveloped with weak legislative frameworks and civil society organisations.18 Litigants face 
other obstacles, including lack of financial resources and expertise and, as elsewhere, standing, 
jurisdictions, costs, causation, and enforceability.19 In Ghana, for example, national climate strategy 
and policy do not create legally enforceable commitments. There is no legislation or regulations 
on climate change. In addition to overcoming hurdles of standing, litigation in Ghana is 
notoriously slow, litigants must rely on private funding in the absence of legal aid, which may make 
cases unaffordable.20 In the few environmental cases that have been filed, civil society organisations 
have focused upon on environmental issues such as pollution from extractive industries. 
[P]otential climate litigation is likely to be subsumed within wider issues of 
environmental protection, land-use, or natural resource conservation, with climate 
impacts a secondary consideration. [This] is perhaps a more practical way of tackling 
climate change concerns within the existing legal and political situation […] and 
reinforcing the need for climate governance to be part of, rather than separate from, 
broader global environmental governance. This strategy, however, risks weakening any 
efforts to develop a body of climate change litigation.21 
 
right to development and that it is ‘more favourable to the individual, and more restrictive to the developmentalist 
state’ (Frans Viljoen, Human Rights Law in Africa (OUP 2012), 272. 
16 Joana Setzer and Lisa Benjamin. ‘Climate litigation in the Global South: constraints and innovations’ (2020) 9(1) 
Transnational Environmental Law, 77, 81. 
17 Peel and Lin (n 7) 694. 
18 Makau Mutua, ‘Africa and the Rule of Law’ (2016) 23 SUR-International Journal on Human Rights 159. 
19 International Bar Association. Model Statute for Proceedings Challenging Government Failure to Act on Climate Change: An 
International Bar Association Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force Report (IBA 2020), Ch. III. The 
model statute provides a template for limiting litigation costs. It can be used by environmental activists to pressurise 
governments to legislate. 
20 Erinosho, Bolanle, ‘Climate Change Litigation in Ghana: An Analysis of the Role of Courts in Enforcing Climate 
Change Law’, (2020) 114 American Journal of International Law Unbound 51. 
21 Ibid. 53. 
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II. DOMESTIC, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Domestic 
The obvious place for litigants to seek relief for climatic harms is in domestic courts. In Africa, 
the ability to litigate is constrained by significant capacity constraints in many countries.22 These 
include weak legislative and regulatory frameworks, poor governance and enforcement 
mechanisms, limited access to financial, legal and technical resources, and the absence of strong 
human rights protections. In the global South, plaintiffs ‘are more likely to use litigation to compel 
governments to enforce existing policies for mitigation and adaptation, attempting to overcome 
implementation constraints’.23 
Because the window to prevent the catastrophic consequences of global temperature increasing 
by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius is rapidly closing, climate litigation must perform a dual role. 
First, it provides litigants with a means of redress for specific rights violations and climatic harms. 
Second, it is also an avenue for climate justice through strategic cases which ‘aim to influence 
public and private climate accountability. These cases tend to be high-profile, as parties seek to 
leverage the litigation to instigate broader policy debates and change’.24 Landmark cases such as 
Ashgar Leghari and Urgenda have addressed human rights violations or sought to compel 
governments to adhere to their commitments under the Paris Agreement.25 The first judgment 
against a carbon major in a strategic case will signal a substantial breakthrough.  
B. Regional 
At the regional level, the main instrument on which future climate litigation might be based is the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was adopted in 1981.26 This paved the way 
of the creation in 1987 of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) to 
monitor implementation of the Charter (also known as the Banjul Charter).27 Monitoring was 
 
22 Setzer and Benjamin (n 16). 
23 Setzer and Benjamin (n 16) 3. Victory over a carbon major for climatic harms from the extraction and emission of 
fossil fuels is the Holy Grail of climate litigation but is more likely to occur in a Northern jurisdiction. 
24 Setzer and Brynes (n 6) 2. 
25 Ashgar Leghari v Federation of Pakistan [2015] W.P. No. 25501/201, Lahore High Court, 4 April 2015; The State of the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) v Stichting Urgenda (case number 19/00135, 20 December 2019), 
Netherlands Supreme Court. On these cases, see also the Chapters by Bersha Ohredar and Christine Bakker in this 
volume. 
26 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
27 The ACHPR is a quasi–judicial body for promoting and protecting human rights throughout the African continent. 
It came into force on 21 October 1986. The Commission interprets the African Charter and considers individual 
complains of the violations of the Charter. 
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enhanced by the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) in 
2004.28 Complainants must exhaust domestic remedies before approaching either institution. 
Unlike the ACHPR, the Court has the power to issue binding decisions and, potentially significant 
for climate litigation, NGOs have standing to bring cases before it. The ACtHPR has received a 
handful of environmental cases since 2005 but none specifically on global heating. 
Article 3 of the 1998 Protocol gives the ACtHPR jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on ‘any 
legal matter relating to the Charter or other relevant human rights instruments, provided that the 
subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission’. In 
contrast, the IACtHR and the European Court of Human Rights may only consider violations of 
the regional instruments they oversee. This gives the ACtHPR substantial scope for action to issue 
an advisory opinion or adjudicate a contentious case on global heating – a situation that has not 
yet been faced with. 
Applications to the Court may be made by the African Commission or other African 
intergovernmental organizations, by states involved in complaints before the ACHPR, and by 
states whose citizen’s human rights are violated. Other state parties to the Protocol with an interest 
in a case may be permitted by the Court to join proceedings. In addition, applications may be 
lodged directly by individuals and NGOs with Observer Status before the African Commission, 
but only against states which have accepted the competence of the Court under Article 5(3) of the 
Protocol. 
Future climate litigants in Africa might include individuals and communities displaced by climate 
breakdown under Article 20(3) of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance 
of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention).29 Women have the right to a 
healthy and sustainable environment under the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa as well as the environmental right in the 
Charter itself. The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and 
the African Charter on the Welfare of the Child (ACWC) might also provide a basis for litigation.30 
 
28 The ACtHPR was established under the 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples’ Rights on 
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 10 June 1998 (hereafter: ‘the 1998 Protocol’). 
The ACtHPR hears cases from the 30 African Union (AU) member states that have ratified the Protocol. 
29 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention, 2009); African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Algiers Charter), 
adopted 15 September 1968, entered into force 16 June 1969. The Kampala Convention links migration to the adverse 
effects of climate change and article 20(3) allows complaints by internally displaced persons to the ACHPR and the 
ACtHPR, but this has not yet occurred in relation to global heating. 
30 The ACWC does not contain an environmental right but Article 1 provides that ‘Every child shall have the right 
to enjoy the best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health’. The provisions of article 2 pertaining to 
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Other avenues for potential litigants seeking climate justice are the ECOWAS Court of Justice and 
East African Court of Justice, which were initially created as economic courts but have acquired 
extensive human rights jurisdiction—the former through an explicit mandate, the latter through 
expansive interpretation of its mandate.31  Neither court requires the exhaustion of local remedies. 
 
C. International 
Two trends stand out in recent landmark climate cases: attempts to enforce the Paris Agreement 
and rights-based petitions. Both were prominent in Urgenda, the Court of Appeal’s ruling in January 
2020 that plans for a third runway at Heathrow airport are illegal, and the Thabametsi case in South 
Africa.32 Human rights were also a central to the plaintiff’s argument in Ashgar Leghari.33 
Human rights arguably enjoy greater legitimacy than legislation because they highlight the 
individual impacts of climatic harms in the Anthropocene. Rights-based litigation tends to be 
retrospective but successful cases may deter future violations. Peel and Osofsky identify a 
discernible ‘rights turn in climate litigation’,34 and courts appear willing to recognise the right to a 
healthy environment—for example in the 2017 Advisory Opinion of the IACtHR.35 Liability for 
 
adequate nutrition and safe drinking water might form the basis for a complaint or communication to the 
Committee of Experts, which may be submitted by individuals, groups, and non-governmental organizations 
recognised by member states, the AU or an international body. States are excluded from this process. 
31 Nkiruka Chidia Maduekwe, ‘The East African Court of Justice and a human rights approach to climate change’, 2 
October 2018 <https://www.ibanet.org/Article/NewDetail.aspx?ArticleUid=9060a02f-a66a-4b0c-bcd9-
29b4ccd923ae>, accessed 2 May 2020. Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 of 19 January 2005 gives the 
ECOWAS Court similar powers to the ACtHPR. In 2005, Supplementary Protocol A/SP1/01/05 gave the ECOWAS 
Court broad human rights jurisdiction. Judges in the East African Court of Justice and the Tribunal of the Southern 
African Development Community have unilaterally asserted their authority to adjudicate human rights claims. See 
Karen J, Alter, Laurence R. Helfer, and Jacqueline R. McAllister ‘A new international human rights court for West 
Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice’, (2013) 107(4) American Journal of International Law 737. 
32 R (On The Application Of Plan B Earth) (Claimant) v Secretary Of State For Transport (Defendant) & (1) Heathrow Airport 
Ltd (2) Arora Holdings Ltd (Interested Parties) & WWF-UK (Intervener), Case Nos: C1/2019/1053, C1/2019/1056 and 
C1/2019/1145; Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others, Case No. 65662/16, High Court, 
Order of 8 Mar. 2017. See Jean-Claude Ashukem, ‘Setting the Scene for Climate Change Litigation in South Africa: 
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 58 (2017) 
65662/16’ (2017) 13 Law, Environment and Development Journal 35; Tracy-Lynn Humby, ‘The Thabametsi Case: 
Case No 65662/16 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs’, (2018) 30 Journal of 
Environmental Law 145; see also the Chapter by Humby in this volume. 
33 Ashgar Leghari (n 24). The plaintiff contended that climate change seriously threatens fundamental rights in the 
Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, including the rights to life, dignity of person and privacy of home, and the right to 
property. 
34 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, ‘A Rights Turn in Climate Litigation?’ (2018) 7(1) Transnational Environmental 
Law 37. 
35 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Environment and Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17, 15 
November 2017, Requested by the Republic of Colombia. 
On environmental rights see David Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of Constitutions, Human 
Rights, and the Environment (University of British Columbia Press 2011) and John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds), 
The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (CUP 2018). 
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greenhouse gas emissions and other climatic harms is not addressed by international human rights 
law, but the Philippines Human Rights Commission has ruled that major fossil fuel companies 
have a moral obligation to respect human rights.36 
The climate regime is also weak on human rights. The preamble to the Paris Agreement contains 
the sole reference to human rights in a multilateral environmental agreement to date. It requires 
parties to: 
respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right 
to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, 
persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to 
development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and 
intergenerational equity. 
Inclusion of human rights in the operative part of the Paris Agreement—which was resisted mainly 
by developed countries—would have facilitated climate litigation, but rights-based litigation is 
proving to be a productive strategy in landmark cases such as Urgenda and Ashgar Leghari.37 
Individual petitions to international human rights bodies specifically on global heating are rare. 
The first climate cases before international human rights bodies were brought in 2019 and 2020.38 
In September 2019, 16 youths, including one from South Africa, submitted a complaint about 
climate change with the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, but no case has 
emerged in Africa.39 
Every country in the African Union (AU) recognises the right to a healthy environment through 
the Charter, its constitution or in legislation.40 A singular advantage of the African system is that 
the environmental right in article 24 of the Charter is collective. 
 
36 In December 2019, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines announced that 47 carbon majors, the 
world’s biggest polluters, could be held liable for their contributions to global heating <http://chr.gov.ph/nicc-2/>, 
accessed 12 April 2020. 
37 Sam Adelman, ‘Human Rights in the Paris Agreement: Too Little, too Late?’ (2018) Transnational Environmental Law 
7(1) (special issue on A Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change: Reflections on the Paris Agreement), 17-36. 
38 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is the only regional body to have received an individual petition: 
the 2005 Inuit petition <http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/AAC_PETITION_13-04-23a.pdf>, accessed 3 
May 2020. 
39 Sacchi et al. v Argentina et al. <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2019/20190923_Not-available_petition-1.pdf>, accessed 10 
May 2020. The other case involved a claim for asylum due to climate displacement: UN Human Rights Committee, 
Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 
2728/2016, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, 7 January 2020. 
40 Recognition of the Right to a Healthy Environment in Constitutions, Legislation and Treaties: Africa Region, 
UNGA A/HRC/43/53/Annex IV, 14 February 2020. 
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III. CLIMATE-RELATED LITIGATION IN AFRICA  
A. Rights-based Litigation 
The African Charter was the first international treaty to recognise a collective right to a healthy 
environment. Article 24 states: ‘All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory 
environment favourable to their development’. Peoples are not defined, but ACtHPR 
jurisprudence suggests that sub-state communities such as ethnic groups are bearers of the right 
along with individuals and the wider public.41 The African Commission has argued that the right 
to a satisfactory environment is important for safety, quality of life, and to promote development.42 
Provisions similar to article 24 have been included in several African constitutions since 1986, e.g. 
Benin, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa. 
In 2001, the ACHPR became the first international human rights body to address the right to a 
healthy environment in the SERAC Communication.43 The Social and Economic Rights Action 
Centre (SERAC) and Centre for Economic and Social Rights brought an actio popularis against 
Nigeria’s military government and Shell alleging widespread environmental contamination from 
oil spills and gas flaring. The plaintiffs alleged that the resulting health problems of the Ogoni 
people in the Niger Delta violated their right to health, to the free disposal of their wealth and 
resources, and their right to a healthy environment.44 The ACHPR identified ‘four levels of duties 
for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil these rights’, and adumbrated the obligations that arise from article 24.45 The 
Commission found that the Nigerian government ‘did not live up to the minimum expectations 
of the African Charter’ in failing to prevent pollution, regulate the oil companies; to hold them 
accountable for these violations; to ‘take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and 
n 42)ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources’; or to require and publicise ‘environmental and social 
impact studies prior to any major industrial development.’46 
 
41 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v The Republic of Kenya, Application no. 006/2012, African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 15 March 2013, para. 197. Morné van der Linde and Lirette Louw, ‘Considering the 
Interpretation and Implementation of Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Light of 
the SERAC Communication’ (2003) 3 African Human Rights Law Journal 167, 174. 
42 Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria, Comm No 
155/96 (ACHPR 2001), para. 51. 
43 SERAC v Nigeria (n 42). 
44 Articles 16, 21 and 24 in the African Charter. 
45 SERAC v Nigeria (n 42), para 44. 
46 SERAC v Nigeria (n 42), paras. 52, 53, 68. 
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The ACHPR has subsequently issued several resolutions on climate change, but the SERAC case 
is the only legal action it has taken in relation to climate change to date.47 
In 2009, the ACHPR urged member states to ensure human rights safeguards are included in 
legal texts on climate change as preventive preventive measures against forced relocation, unfair 
dispossession of property, and loss of livelihoods. The Commission called for special protection 
for vulnerable groups such as children, women, the elderly, indigenous communities and victims 
of natural disasters to be included in any international agreement or instruments on climate 
change. The ACHPR decided to carry out a study on the impact of climate change on human 
rights in Africa. 
  
Resolution 271 in 2014, requested the the Working Group on Extractive Industries, Environment 
and Human Rights Violations in Africa to undertake an in-depth study on the impact of climate 
change on human rights in Africa. This call was repeated in 2016 in Resolution 342 on Climate 
Change and Human Rights in Africa, which also encouraged comprehensive climate action to 
ensure the human rights of Africans are safeguarded to the greatest extent possible, with special 
protections for vulnerable groups. 
In 2019, in Resolution 417, the ACHPR called upon AU members ‘to ensure that contingency 
plans and emergency measures are put in place to increase the level of preparedness for an increase 
in extreme weather events and unstable weather patterns as the consequences of climate change 
intensify’; to fully integrate climate change  and human rights protections into their  development 
plans; to strengthen regional cooperation on adaptation, mitigation and responses to climatic 
harms; and called upon the AU to declare 2021 the African Union Year on Climate Change. 
Peel and Lin identify rights-based arguments in five of the six cases filed or adjudicated in Africa 
(one in Nigeria and Uganda, three in South Africa).48 These cases are also based upon other legal 
provisions such as the requirement for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) discussed in the 
following section. 
 
B. Environmental Impact Assessments 
 
47 Resolution on Climate Change and Human Rights and the Need to Study its Impact in Africa-
ACHPR/Res.153(XLVI)2009; Resolution on Climate Change in Africa - ACHPR/Res.271(LV)2014; 342 Resolution 
on Climate Change and Human Rights in Africa - ACHPR/Res.342(LVIII)2016; Resolution on the human rights 
impacts of extreme weather in Eastern and Southern Africa due to climate change-ACHPR/Res. 417 (LXIV)2019. 
48 Peel and Lin (n 7) 706. 
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1. Nigeria 
In Peel and Lin’s classification, five of the six climate-related cases in Africa have relied upon 
legislation requiring environmental impact assessments.49 
The first challenge to a government’s failure to properly implement an environmental impact 
assessment came in 2005. Jonah Gbemre, representing the Iwherekan community in the Niger 
Delta filed suit against the Nigerian government and Shell for serious environmental harms from 
‘massive, relentless and continuous gas flaring’.50 The federal court ruled that the flaring is a gross 
violation the fundamental rights to life and dignity of the human person in sections 33(1) and 34(1) 
of the Constitution and articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter, and that article 24 logically 
includes the right to a ‘poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment’. This violation was 
due in part to the failure to carry out a compulsory EIA under the Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act of Nigeria (No 86 of 1992). The federal court relied upon the environmental right 
in the African Charter in holding that: 
The right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under article 24 of the 
African Charter or the right to a healthy environment […] imposes clear obligations 
upon a government. It requires the state to take reasonable and other measures to 
prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure 
an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources.51 
Kotzé and du Plessis regard the Gbemre case as ‘a victory for the interpretation and application of 
environmental rights’ despite the absence of a right to a healthy environment in Nigeria’s 
Constitution but fifteen years on from the decision, the case remains on appeal and gas flaring 
continues.52 
 
2. Kenya 
In Save Lamu, local and foreign NGOs and members of the Lamu community challenged the 
granting of an EIA license for the Lamu Coal-fired Power Plant, which would have been the first 
 
49 The exception is Mbabazi (n 59). 
50 Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. and Others (FHC/B/CS/53/05). Peel and Lin (n 5) classify 
the case as peripheral because climate change did not feature in the pleadings or the court’s decision. 
51 SERAC v. Nigeria (n 42), para. 52. 
52 Louis Kotzé and Anel du Plessis (2019) ‘Putting Africa on the Stand: A Bird’s Eye View of Climate Change Litigation 
on the Continent’, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation. ISSN 1049-0280, 25 
<http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/36688/> accessed 16 December 2019. 
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coal-fired power station in East Africa.53 The National Environmental Tribunal set aside the license 
because the National Environmental Management Authority had violated the National 
Environmental (Impact Assessment) Audit Regulations of 2003 by granting it without adequate 
public participation. The tribunal found the Amu Power Company’s Environmental and Social 
Impact Assessment to be incomplete and scientifically insufficient because it failed to consider the 
Climate Change Act of 2016. The tribunal ordered a new assessment, but the case rumbles on in 
a succession of appeals.54 
 
3. South Africa 
Most EIA-related litigation has occurred in South Africa and are discussed in Humby’s chapter in 
this volume.55 In 2017, the Earthlife NGO successfully challenged the approval of a license for a 
coal-fired power plant based on a flawed EIA.56 The decision is notable for the court’s ruling that 
South Africa’s commitments under the Paris Agreement to be relevant consideration for the 
environmental review of a coal-fired power plant. This case inspired similar cases involving EIAs.57 
The potential of cross-pollination is demonstrated by an Indonesian case closely modelled on 
Thabametsi.58 
 
C. Public Trust 
1. Uganda 
 
53 Save Lamu et al. v National Environmental Management Authority and Amu Power Co. Ltd. (Tribunal Appeal No. Net 196 
of 2016). 
54 Save Lamu & 5 others v National Environmental Management Authority (Nema) & another [2019] eKLR, Appeal No. 3 of 
2018, rejected on 24 January 2019 <http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/167761>, accessed 15 January 2020. 
55 The South African cases are discussed in that chapter at the editors’ request. 
56 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of Environmental Affairs & Others, Case No. 65662/16, High Court, Order of 8 
Mar. 2017. Tracy-Lynn Humby, ‘The Thabametsi Case: Case No 65662/16 Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs’, (2018) 30 Journal of Environmental Law 145. 
57 Khanyisa Thermal Power Station RF (Pty) Ltd, and Others (Case No. 61561/17); Trustees for the Time Being of the 
GroundWork Trust v Minister of Environmental Affairs, KiPower (Pty) Ltd, and Others (Case no. 54087/17). See 
also the Constitutional Court decision on coal mining in a strategic water zone in Mpumalanga: Mining and Environmental 
Justice Community Network of South Africa and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others (50779/2017) [2018] 
ZAGPPHC 807; [2019] 1 All SA 491 (GP) (8 November 2018). 
58 Greenpeace Indonesia and Others v Bali Provincial Governor, 2/G/LH/2018/PTUN.DPS (Denpasar Admin. Ct., Jan. 24, 
2018). On South-South cooperation, see Peel and Lin (n 7) 705. 
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Another example of cross-pollination is the 2012 case filed by the Greenwatch NGO against the 
Uganda government on behalf of four local youth.59 The case also demonstrates the importance 
of legal and financial support from the global North. 
The plaintiffs argued that the government is a public trustee of the country’s natural resources, 
including its atmosphere, and is obliged to protect them on behalf of current and future 
generations. Under article 39 of the Constitution, ‘Every Ugandan has a right to a clean and healthy 
environment’. Article 237(2)(b) states that national or local government ‘shall hold in trust for the 
people and protect natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks 
and any land to be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common good of all 
citizens’.60 The plaintiffs argued that the government was violating its obligations under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto protocol, which ‘require parties to put in place powerful and legally 
binding measures to curtail climate change’.61 The plaintiffs contended that the government’s 
duties include sustainable use of natural resources to ‘ensure that the atmosphere is free from 
pollution for the present and future generations’; and to uphold the ‘right to a clean and healthy 
environment’. They requested a declaration that government is violating its public trust duty and 
an order compelling it to provide accurate information on national greenhouse gas emissions and 
a clear mitigation plan. In a preliminary hearing, the High Court ordered the parties to undertake 
a 90-day mediation process that failed to resolve the matter. The court held a hearing in May 2019 
to enable the young plaintiffs to present evidence of the government’s failure to take adequate 
mitigation and adaptation measures to protect young people and future generations but has taken 
no further action. 
Since the case was brought, the Ugandan government has issued new climate change policy and 
published a draft bill that falls short on adaptation measures to mitigate water and food shortages, 
ill health and mass migration.62  
D. Duty of Vigilance 
 
59 Mbabazi and Others v The Attorney General and National Environmental Management Authority (Civil Suit No. 283 of 2012). 
The litigation was supported by Our Children’s Trust, the NGO that brought the Juliana case in Oregon that was 
dismissed by the Ninth Circuit Appeal Court in January 2020: US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, No. 18-
36082, D.C. No. 6:15-cv-01517AA, Opinion, 17 January 2020. 
60 See Samuel Varvastian, ‘A Natural Resource Beyond the Sky: Invoking the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect the 
Atmosphere from Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ in Helle Tegner Anker and Birgitte Egelund Olsen (eds), Sustainable 
Management of Natural Resources: Legal Instruments and Approaches (Intersentia 2018). 
61 Mbabazi (n 59) para. 5(h). 
62 The Uganda National Climate Change Policy was published 2015 < 
https://www.mwe.go.ug/sites/default/files/library/National%20Climate%20Change%20Policy%20April%202015
%20final.pdf>, accessed 20 June 2020. See also the National Environment Act, Act 5 of 2019. 
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Uganda also features in Friends of the Earth et al. v. Total, a case initiated in France in January 2020. 
It is the first case under the corporate duty of vigilance law passed in 2017 that creates a binding 
obligation on parent companies to identify and prevent adverse human rights and environmental 
impacts resulting from their activities, companies they control, and subcontractors and suppliers 
with which they have established commercial relationships.63 
Six NGOs (four Ugandan, two French) and several Ugandan farmers are suing Total for failing to 
adequately assess the threats to human rights and the environment from the Tilenga oil 
megaproject in Uganda and Tanzania.64 It is estimated that the project could displace 50000 
farmers. The claim focuses on human rights and environmental pollution, but also alleges that the 
project’s vigilance plan does not properly consider the greenhouse gas emissions likely to result 
from the project.65 
The significance of the case is twofold. First, it may make European multinationals more 
accountable to local communities and reshape the way they do business in the global South. 
Second, it demonstrates the potential for cooperation between litigants in the global North and 
South despite the setback in January 2020, when the Nanterre High Court of Justice ruled that the 
case must be pursued in a commercial court.66 
 
IV. FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
A. Litigation Based on Climate Change Legislation 
Climate change legislation in a growing number of countries provides possibilities for future 
litigation in Africa.67 The climate-related aspects of Thabametsi, Gbembre and Mbabazi flowed from 
legislation on EIAs, energy resources, environmental problems such as pollution, and human 
rights law.68 This suggests that the absence of climate change statutes is not an insuperable barrier 
 
63 See the chapter on Climate Litigation in France by Marta Torres-Schaub in this volume. Discussions about similar 
legislation are taking place in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Switzerland and the European 
Commission. 
64 The Ugandan NGOs are Friends of the Earth Uganda and NAVODA (Natural Resources, Environmental and Bio-
diversity Conserving Organization). Total, Tullow Oil, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation planned to 
drill more than 400 wells in six oil fields and construct a 900-mile pipeline to Tanzania. 
65 In September 2019, Total SA suspended the proposed $3.5 billion crude export pipeline from Uganda to Tanzania 
after the collapse of a deal to buy a stake in Tullow Oil Plc’s oil fields in Uganda. 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-04/total-suspends-planned-3-5-billion-uganda-tanzania-oil-
pipe>, accessed 15 January 2020. 
66 Tribunal Judiciare de Nanterre, Ordonnance de Refere Redue Le 30 30 Janvier 2020, N° R.G.: 19/02833 - N° 
Portalis DB3R-W-B7D-VIPX <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2020/20200130_NA_judgment-1.pdf>, accessed 20 Jun3 2020. 
67 Climate Change Laws of the World <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/research-theme/governance-and-
legislation/>, accessed 12 May 2020. 
68 Kotzé and du Plessis (n 52) 31. 
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to successful litigation. It also demonstrates that other bodies of law such as administrative law 
provide a wedge to enable litigants to introduce climate-related arguments to extend the scope of 
EIAs. Tort law is the basis of a substantial number of climate cases around the world. Nevertheless, 
litigation is facilitated by legislation that incorporates the Paris Agreement such as Kenya’s Climate 
Change Act 11 of 2016 and South Africa’s pending act. As Lord Carnwath has pointed out: 
National legislatures bear the primary responsibility to give legal effect to the 
commitments undertaken by states under the Paris agreement. However, the courts 
will also have an important role in holding their governments to account, and, so far 
as possible within the constraints of their individual legal systems, in ensuring that 
those commitments are given practical and enforceable effect.69 
None of the 34 cases in the global South classified by Peel and Lin as climate-related involved 
climate change legislation.70 
Legislation incorporating the Paris Agreement gives litigants the possibility to hold governments 
to account for adaptation, mitigation policies and sustainable development policies, rights 
violations, and a just transition. The hybrid nature of the Agreement, which contains top-down 
and bottom up elements, makes it possible for litigants to highlight disparities between a state’s 
emissions and the targets in articles 2 and 4 of the accord or lack of ambition in its non-binding 
Nationally Determined Contribution. Urgenda and the Heathrow decision suggest that courts may 
be willing to assesss states’ emissions obligations on a proportionate basis.71 
 
B. Advisory Opinions 
In addition to domestic litigation, Colombia’s request for an advisory opinion on human rights 
and the environment from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights provides an example that 
might be followed in Africa.72 When domestic remedies are exhausted or unavailable, an 
organisation with standing might seek an advisory opinion from the ACtHPR, which has advisory 
jurisdiction under article 4(1) of the 1998 Protocol.73 This is likely to be a civil society institution 
 
69 Lord Carnwath JSC, ‘Climate Change Adjudication After Paris: A Reflection’ (2016) 28(1) Journal of Environmental 
Law 5, 9. 
70 Peel and Lin (n 7) 708. Kenya’s Climate Change Act of 2016 was referred to in the Save Lamu case discussed below. 
71 Urgenda (n 25); Heathrow (n 32). 
72 Inter-American Court Of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights, Oc-23/17 
of 15 November 2017, Requested by the Republic of Colombia.  
73 Advisory opinions can be requested by member states, the AU or any of its organs, any African organisation 
recognised by the African Union. In 2017, the ACtHPR narrowed standing in deciding that that recognition of NGOs 
by the AU is through the granting of Observer Status or the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
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because AU member states have been relatively reluctant to seek advisory opinions and no 
individual petition has been decided.74 Plaintiffs would have to overcome hurdles such as standing 
and exhaust domestic remedies. But the impact of a positive advisory opinion could be substantial 
and reflect the willingness of courts in other jurisdictions to respond favourably to coherent legal 
arguments that reflect growing public alarm about the climate emergency. By September 2019, the 
ACtHPR had finalised twelve advisory opinions and one was pending.75 In contrast, the Inter-
American Court, handed down ten advisory opinions before adopting its first decision in a 
contentious case.76 Another difference is that the IACtHR has the competence to give an opinion 
about the compatibility of a state’s domestic laws with the treaties within its jurisdiction. 
Consideration has long been given by small island states in the Pacific to seeking an advisory 
opinion from the International Court of Justice on state obligations in relation to climate change. 
Advisory opinions avoid the need for individuals to seek redress (which is costly) and the political 
backlash that may result from contentious litigation between states.77 Wewerinke-Singh and Salili 
argue that even though such opinions are not binding, they have the potential to clarify the rights 
and obligations of states, improve the negotiating hands of climate-vulnerable states in the 
UNFCCC, influence other areas of international law such as international trade law and investment 
arbitration, and empower citizens, local governments and non-governmental organisations in 
holding recalcitrant states to account before regional and domestic courts.78 
The merits of a case  in contentious proceedings can be considered by the (ACtHPR) through 
direct access by litigants or indirect access via the African Commission.79 The Court can issue an 
opinion on any matter relating to the Charter or other relevant human rights instruments at the 
 
NGO. App 001/2013 Advisory Opinion on the Request for Advisory Opinion by the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability 
Project (SERAP) (Advisory Opinion), 26 May 2017, para. 64). As a result, NGOs paradoxically have broader standing in 
contentious matters for which they only require recognition by the Commission. 
74 The Court can deliver advisory opinions on any legal question at the request of the Assembly, the Parliament, the 
Executive Council, the Peace and Security Council, the Economic, Social, and Cultural Council, the Financial 
Institutions, or any other organ of the African Union as authorised by the Assembly. By 2019, the Court’s advisory 
jurisdiction had been requested thirteen times. 
75 ACHPR <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-19-35#statistical-summary>, 
accessed 2 May 2020. 
76 Christiane Lucena Carneiro, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System’ in Gordon DiGiacomo and Susan Kang 
(eds) The Institutions of Human Rights: Developments and Practices (University of Toronto Press 2019) 212. 
77 Cecilia M. Bailliet, ‘The Strategic Prudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Rejection of Requests 
for an Advisory Opinion’, (2018) 15(1) The Brazilian Journal of International Law 255, 276. 
78 Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh and Diana Hinge Salili, ‘Between negotiations and litigation: Vanuatu’s perspective 
on loss and damage from climate change’ (2019) 1 Climate Policy 8: DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2019.1623166. See also 
Daniel Bodanksy, ‘The role of the international court of justice in addressing climate change: Some preliminary 
reflections’ (2017) 49 Arizona State Law Journal, 659. 
79 The Court began functioning in 2006. Its capacity to deliver binding decisions complements the quasi-judicial 
mandate of the African Commission. 
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request of a Member State of the African Union, any of the organs of the AU, or any African 
organisation recognised by the AU provided that the matter is not related to a matter being 
examined by the Commission.80 
An advantage of advisory opinions is their non-contentious nature in that they do not involve 
proceedings against member states but rather an application to the Court to clarify a matter of law 
or to establish its position on a particular matter. AU members have indicated a strong preference 
for diplomatic rather than legal solutions. 
The issue for which an advisory opinion is sought will be important, both to increase the likelihood 
that the ACtHPR will accept it and to achieve the broadest possible impact across the continent. 
Article 24 provides a collective right to a healthy environment, and the obligation to act jointly or 
collectively, which is explicit in relation to the right to development in the African Charter, may 
enable litigants to argue that states have positive extraterritorial obligations toward African 
peoples.81 The SERAC strategy—which surprisingly has not been repeated—focused on a 
particular environmental problem and suggests that pollution amounting to ecocide might form 
the basis for a petition. This might be linked to deforestation or the compatibility of ecologically 
unsustainable extractive development with the conception of sustainable development in Agenda 
2063: The Africa We Want.82 Adopted in 2015, the Agenda outlines the AU’s 50-year development 
strategy and its aspiration for ‘A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable 
development’. Africa is expected to achieve ‘environmentally sustainable and climate resilient 
economies and communities’ by 2063. A request for an advisory opinion might also rely upon the 
Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, which 
reaffirms the responsibility of state parties ‘to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction’.83 States should use environment and natural resources in a ‘sustainable 
manner with the aim to satisfy human needs according to the carrying capacity of the 
environment’.84 
 
80 The ACtHPR handed down its first decision on an environmental matter in 2017 in African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights v Republic of Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 216 (May 
26, 2017). See Lilian Chenwi, ‘The Right to a Satisfactory, Healthy, and Sustainable Environment in the African 
Regional Human Rights System’ in John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds) The Human Right to a Healthy Environment 
(CUP 2018). 
81 Scholtz (n 13) 404. 
82 Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want (African Union Commission 2015). 
83 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
Stockholm, June 5 to 16, 1972, UN Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Principle 21; Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development (A/CONF.151/26, vol. I), Principle 2. 
84 Preamble to the Revised African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 
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In March 2016, Colombia requested an Advisory Opinion from the IACtHR on the application 
of the American Convention on Human Rights to severe degradation of the human and marine 
environment of the Wider Caribbean Region from the acts or omissions of Caribbean states 
through major new infrastructure projects.85 The IACtHR held that the right to a healthy 
environment is a right in itself, that a wide range of human rights are threatened by environmental 
degradation, and that state parties have obligations to respect and guarantee the rights in the 
American Convention, including undertaking EIAs when there is a risk of significant damage to 
the environment. The Court invoked international environmental law principles such as the 
precautionary principle and the duty to cooperate in good faith that have rarely been effective. 
Campbell-Duruflé and Atapattu argue that the Advisory Opinion has significant implications in 
relation to enforceability, causality, and extraterritoriality, and opens the possibility that the 
negative impacts of environmental degradation on economic, social, and cultural rights are 
justiciable in and of themselves.86 They maintain that the Opinion makes it possible to invoke 
human rights obligations: 
before climate-change-induced harms have materialized, as well as subsequently, thereby 
shifting the focus from establishing causation between the actions or omissions of states and 
climate harms to whether states have contributed to the risk that such harm will occur.87 
There is no obvious impediment to a similar request to the ACtHPR. 
The existence of the right to a healthy environment in domestic constitutions offers another 
avenue for a test case. A favourable decision from the South African Constitutional Court on the 
balance between the right to a healthy environment and what constitutes sustainable development 
would be a significant strategic victory. Article 24 states: 
Everyone has the right – 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, 
through reasonable legislative and other measures that – 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
 
85 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion oc-23/17 Requested by the Republic of Colombia, ‘Environment 
and Human Rights’, 15 November 2017. 
86 Christopher Campbell-Duruflé and Sumudu Atapattu, ‘The Inter-American Court’s Environment and Human 
Rights Advisory Opinion: Implications for International Climate Law’ (2018) 8(3-4) Climate Law 321. 
87 Ibid. 333; emphasis in original. 
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(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
To date, most of the cases discussed in this chapter have been brought on environmental problems 
that are climate-related to varying degrees. Given the thin dividing line between environmental 
and climate issues, we can expect this to continue, but climate breakdown is likely to increases the 
number of cases with a greater climatic component. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this brief survey of climate litigation in Africa. First, climate 
litigation in Africa is limited by capacity constraints. Constitutional rights provisions, regional 
instruments such as the African Charter and international human rights and climate law facilitate 
litigation, but domestic climate change legislation offers the most immediate basis for climate 
litigation. 
Second, strategic cases are likely to have an influence beyond the jurisdiction in which they are 
brought. Peel and Lin suggest that most Southern litigants seek to compel governments to translate 
adaptation and mitigation policies into action or to avoid environmental harms. Most cases reflect 
the linkage between greenhouse gas emissions and chronic environmental pollution problems.88 
Thus, while most cases are likely to focus upon localised environmental issues such as EIAs, the 
degree to which they are based upon human rights claims and government commitments under 
the Paris Agreement, the greater will be their impact—as Urgenda and the Heathrow litigation 
demonstrate. The growing number of cases involving youth and intergenerational justice suggest 
that this might be a particularly productive path to follow.89 Decisions in Southern tribunals are 
are less likely to be regarded as landmarks even though their impact across the global South may 
be. Litigants in one country adapt litigation strategies: for example, the Mbabazi case draws on the 
public trust doctrine used in the Juliana case in Oregon and is available in Southern jurisdictions 
such as India, Pakistan and South Africa.90 A positive advisory opinion from the ACtHPR along 
the lines of that by the IACtHR that adumbrates state obligations to protect human rights and 
promote ecologically sustainable development may have a significant impact throughout the AU. 
 
88 Peel and Lin (n 7) 714, 716. 
89 West Coast Environmental Law <https://www.wcel.org/blog/youth-are-leading-climate-movement-in-court-and-
streets>, accessed 10 May 2020. 
90 Mbabazi (n 59). Juliana v United States 217 F Supp 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016). See also Climate Litigation in the United 
States by Michael Gerrard in this volume. 
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Third, the involvement of NGOs such as SERAC, Earthlife and Greenwatch and environmental 
lawyers is an important way of overcoming capacity constraints.91 SERAC, the South African EIA 
cases, Mbabazi and the Total case were brought by individual litigants or communities in 
conjunction with local or international NGOs as co-litigants or amici curiae. Fifty per cent of climate 
cases in the global South fall in this category.92 
Fourth, as public alarm about global heating increases, it is important to take advantage of the 
apparent willingness of courts in different jurisdictions to hand down favourable decisions when 
presented with innovative, well-crafted legal arguments. With time running out, now is the time to 
litigate, even at the risk of failure. The history of climate litigation suggests that cases are unlikely 
to succeed in the first instance but that success or failure in one country provides lessons for 
litigation strategies elsewhere. 
Fifth, North-South cooperation can play a significant role. All the African cases have been against 
governments alone or together with companies such as Shell, but the case against Total SA 
indicates the potential for litigation directly against corporations. The Total case shows the potential 
for Southern involvement in Northern cases and vice versa. Other examples are the Mbabazi case 
and the so-called Peoples’ Climate Case filed with the European General Court in 2018 on behalf 
of families and youths from Europe, Kenya and Fiji.93 This has benefits for both sides including 
the transfer of knowledge, expertise and financial resources to Southern actors and moral 
legitimacy and positive media exposure public awareness-raising for Northern organisations.94 
Such partnering is strategic: Global South advocates benefit from the expertise and 
financial resources of Global North organizations, while the inclusion of Southern 
advocates’ local knowledge and the stories of Global South plaintiffs may lend greater 
moral legitimacy to the claims advanced in court, as well as in accompanying media and 
public awareness-raising campaigns.95 
 
91 NGO activities are restricted by legislation in many low and middle-income countries: UNEP, Environmental Rule of 
Law: First Global Report (UN Environment Programme 2019). 
92 J Peel and Lin (n 7) 710. 
93 Case T-330/18 Carvalho & Others v European Parliament and Council, Order of the European General Court, May 8, 
2019. The court denied the applicants’ standing to bring the case. In July 2019, the applicants’ appealed to the 
European Court of Justice. See also Climate Litigation before European Courts by Marc Willers in this volume. 
94 Peel and Lin (n 7). 
95 Ibid. 684. 
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South-South cross-pollination and solidarity is important because developing countries face similar 
problems. The Thabametsi and Greenpeace Indonesia litigation demonstrates the potential for litigants 
to learn from each other. 
Former NASA climate scientist James Hansen has called for a wave of litigation to address the 
failure of the Paris Agreement, which he describes as ‘eyewash’ because it fails to price the social 
cost of carbon. Hansen believes national legislation is doomed to fail because governments are too 
beholden to lobbyists.96 Since the time is running out to prevent global temperature from 
increasing by more than 1.5oC above preindustrial levels and catastrophic global heating and 
because litigation is a lengthy process, all avenues at all levels in all places must be urgently 
considered.97 
 
96 Jonathan Watts, ‘“We should be on the offensive” – James Hansen calls for wave of climate lawsuits’, The Guardian, 
17 November 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/17/we-should-be-on-the-offensive-
james-hansen-calls-for-wave-of-climate-lawsuits>, accessed 12 May 2020. 
97 IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report (IPCC 2018). 
